{"id":"kh-llm-425aea8f211e31b60bb6ba15","text":"Hence, only the classification of the elements themselves (amongst concrete things), at present, depends largely upon empirical Coinherence. If the elements remain irresolvable into anything simpler, the definitions of the co-inherent characters that distinguish them must be reckoned amongst the ultimate Uniformities of Nature. But if a definite theory of their origin both generally and severally, whether out of ether-vortices, or groups of electric corpuscles, or whatnot, shall ever gain acceptance, similarity of genesis or causation will naturally be the leading consideration in classifying the chemical elements. To find common principles of causation, therefore, constitutes the verification of every Natural Classification. The ultimate explanation of nature is always causation; the Law of Causation is the backbone of the system of Experience. Precision of thought needs precision of language for the recording of such thought and for communicating it to others. We can often remember with great vividness persons, things, landscapes, changes and actions of persons or things, without the aid of language (though words are often mixed with such trains of imagery), and by this means may form judgments and inferences in particular cases; but for general notions, judgments and inferences, not merely about this or that man, or thing, but about all men or all kinds of things, we need something besides the few images we can form of them from observation.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":223,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":0,"text_sha256":"8eb5d83a794444490c71ddeddeae5fb958b438a6166ff453030127bb2ab0d3b1","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-8d2900d18b047d3219ef18b5","text":"Even if we possess generic images, say, of 'horse' or 'cat' (that is, images formed, like composite photographs, by a coalescence of the images of all the horses or cats we have seen, so that their common properties stand out and their differences frustrate and cancel one another), these are useless for precise thought; for the generic image will not correspond with the general appearance of horse or cat, unless we have had proportional experience of all varieties and have been impartially interested in all; and, besides, what we want for general thought is not a generic image of the appearance of things, though it were much more definite and fairly representative than such images ever are, but a general representation of their important characters; which may be connected with internal organs, such as none but an anatomist ever sees. We require a symbol connected with the general character of a thing, or quality, or process, as scientifically determined, whose representative truth may be trusted in ordinary cases, or may be verified whenever doubt arises. Such symbols are for most purposes provided by language; Mathematics and Chemistry have their own symbols. § 2. First there should be \"a name for every important meaning\": (a) A Nomenclature, or system of the names of all classes of objects, adapted to the use of each science.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":221,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":1,"text_sha256":"5cbfc170e3f44abe0c263bab352e44dacef7d74f5acecb45a295ce7ec6af8018","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-ef4589bf389f63708c1a981c","text":"Thus, in Geology there are names for classes of rocks and strata, in Chemistry for the elements and their compounds, in Zoology and Botany for the varieties and species of animals and plants, their genera, families and orders. To have such names, however, is not the whole aim in forming a scientific language; it is desirable that they should be systematically significant, and even elegant. Names, like other instruments, ought to be efficient, and the efficiency of names consists in conveying the most meaning with the least effort. In Botany and Zoology this result is obtained by giving to each species a composite name which includes that of the genus to which it belongs. The species of Felidæ given in chap. xvii. § 7, are called _Felis leo_ (lion), _Felis tigris_ (tiger), _Felis leopardus_ (leopard), _Felis concolor_ (puma), _Felis lyncus_ (European lynx), _Felis catus_ (wild cat). In Chemistry, the nomenclature is extremely efficient. Names of the simpler compounds are formed by combining the names of the elements that enter into them; as Hydrogen Chloride, Hydrogen Sulphide, Carbon Dioxide; and these can be given still more briefly and efficiently in symbols, as HCl, H_{2}S, CO_{2}. The symbolic letters are usually initials of the names of the elements: as C = Carbon, S = Sulphur; sometimes of the Latin name, when the common name is English, as Fe = Iron.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":224,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":2,"text_sha256":"f3e1f3cd49bacd85010dab50082668b9680fe9b5031897e5410ea9f8d95dd81e","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-8a3b0de85270607d4101537f","text":"Each letter represents a fixed quantity of the element for which it stands, viz., the atomic weight. The number written below a symbol on the right-hand side shows how many atoms of the element denoted enter into a molecule of the compound. (b) A Terminology is next required, in order to describe and define the things that constitute the classes designated by the nomenclature, and to describe and explain their actions. (i) A name for every integral part of an object, as head, limb, vertebra, heart, nerve, tendon; stalk, leaf, corolla, stamen, pistil; plinth, frieze, etc. (ii) A name for every metaphysical part or abstract quality of an object, and for its degrees and modes; as extension, figure, solidity, weight; rough, smooth, elastic, friable; the various colours, red, blue, yellow, in all their shades and combinations and so with sounds, smells, tastes, temperatures. The terms of Geometry are employed to describe the modes of figure, as angular, curved, square, elliptical; and the terms of Arithmetic to express the degrees of weight, elasticity, temperature, pitch of sound. When other means fail, qualities are suggested by the names of things which exhibit them in a salient way; figures by such terms as amphitheatre, bowl-like, pear-shaped, egg-shaped; colours by lias-blue, sky-blue, gentian-blue, peacock-blue; and similarly with sounds, smells and tastes. It is also important to express by short terms complex qualities, as harmony, fragrance, organisation, sex, symmetry, stratification.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":235,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":3,"text_sha256":"ee7a625952772f1ee91e85d301a0f0b34cee6cb2179d31a9dec0586aef57faec","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-aeff08e27147b9547820be27","text":"(iii) In the explanation of Nature we further require suitable names for processes and activities: as deduction, conversion, verification, addition, integration, causation, tendency, momentum, gravitation, aberration, refraction, conduction, affinity, combination, germination, respiration, attention, association, development. There may sometimes be a difficulty in distinguishing the terms which stand for qualities from those that express activities, since all qualities imply activities: weight, for example, implies gravitation; and the quality heat is also a kind of motion. The distinction aimed at lies between a quality as perceived by means of an effect upon our senses (as weight is resistance to our effort in lifting; heat, a sensation when we approach fire), and that property of a body which is conceived to account for its energy (as gravitation that brings a body to the ground, or physical heat that expands an iron bar or works an engine). The former class of words, expressing qualities, are chiefly used in description: the latter class, expressing activities, are chiefly needed in explanation. They correspond respectively, like classification and explanation, with the static and dynamic aspects of Nature. The terms of ordinary language fall into the same classes as those of science: they stand for things, classes of things, parts, or qualities, or activities of things; but they are far less precise in their signification. As long as popular thought is vague its language must be vague; nor is it desirable too strictly to correct the language whilst the thought is incorrigible.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":244,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":4,"text_sha256":"8096be2cf853f0cb91623b72858b5d5cfbdbf2d7529e2718f6fd8d80c3f7bba8","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-1724e219785f945012b586ce","text":"Much of the effect of poetry and eloquence depends upon the elasticity and indirect suggestiveness of common terms. Even in reasoning upon some subjects, it is a mistake to aim at an unattainable precision. It is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong. In the criticism of manners, of fine art, or of literature, in politics, religion and moral philosophy, what we are anxious to say is often far from clear to ourselves; and it is better to indicate our meaning approximately, or as we feel about it, than to convey a false meaning, or to lose the warmth and colour that are the life of such reflections. It is hard to decide whether more harm has been done by sophists who take a base advantage of the vagueness of common terms, or by honest paralogists (if I may use the word) who begin by deceiving themselves with a plausible definiteness of expression, and go on to propagate their delusions amongst followers eager for systematic insight but ignorant of the limits of its possibility. § 3. A Definition is necessary (if possible) for every scientific name. To define a name is to give a precise statement of its meaning or connotation. The name to be defined is the subject of a proposition, whose predicate is a list of the fundamental qualities common to the things or processes which the subject denotes, and on account of possessing which qualities this name is given to them.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":243,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":5,"text_sha256":"37038204fa1c9117b02642e87c8b2b4f5caac683e277a9d0c7e30531064ce8ec","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-5779e9b372f93ff560028482","text":"The rules for testing a Definition are: I.--As to its Contents-- (1) It must state the whole connotation of the name to be defined. (2) It must not include any quality derivative from the connotation. Such a quality is called a Proprium. A breach of this rule can do no positive harm, but it is a departure from scientific economy. There is no need to state in the definition what can be derived from it; and whatever can be derived by causation, or by mathematical demonstration, should be exhibited in that manner. (3) It must not mention any circumstance that is not a part of the connotation, even though it be universally found in the things denoted. Such a circumstance, if not derivable from the connotation, is called an Accident. That, for example, the lion at present only inhabits the Old World, is an accident: if a species otherwise like a lion were found in Brazil, it would not be refused the name of lion on the score of locality. Whilst, however, the rules of Logic have forbidden the inclusion of proprium or accident in a definition, in fact the definitions of Natural History often mention such attributes when characteristic. Indeed, definitions of superordinate classes--Families and Orders--not infrequently give qualities as generally found in the subordinate classes, and at the same time mention exceptional cases in which they do not occur.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":231,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":7,"text_sha256":"740bac64919115ec7a1b4b8a49b84f2ba39208e4b8f6cba480a447c58268ee76","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-3ffe6545458408d0a672483c","text":"II.--As to its Expression-- (4) A Definition must not include the very term to be defined, nor any cognate. In defining 'lion' we must not repeat 'lion,' nor use 'leonine'; it would elucidate nothing. (5) It must not be put in vague language. (6) It must not be in a negative form, if a positive form be obtainable. We must not be content to say that a lion is 'no vegetarian,' or 'no lover of daylight.' To define a curve as a line 'always changing its direction' may be better than as 'in no part straight.' § 5. The process of determining a Definition is inseparable from classification. We saw that classification consists in distributing things into groups according to their likenesses and differences, regarding as a class those individuals which have most qualities in common. In doing so we must, of course, recognise the common qualities or points of likeness; and to enumerate these is to define the name of the class. If we discover the qualities upon which a class is based by direct observation and induction, by the same method we discover the definition of its name. We saw also that classification is not merely the determination of isolated groups of things, but a systematic arrangement of such groups in relation to one another. Hence, again, Definitions are not independent, but relative to one another; and, of course, in the same way as classes are relative.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":235,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":8,"text_sha256":"195de17d60678f7b9f840413881c0d4f6aa5de2727004cfd4275f01f97eda6ed","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-e66536c366b425024940bb31","text":"That is to say, as a class is placed in subordination to higher or more comprehensive groups, so the definition of its name is subordinate to that of their names; and as a class stands in contrast with co-ordinate classes (those that are in the same degree of subordination to the same higher groups), so the definition of its name is in contrast or co-ordination with the definitions of their names. Lion is subordinate to _Felis_, to Digitigrade, to Carnivore and so on up to Animal; and, beyond the Animal Kingdom, to Phenomenon; it is co-ordinate with tiger, puma, etc.; and more remotely it is co-ordinate with dog, jackal, wolf, which come under _Canis_--a genus co-ordinate with _Felis_. The definition of lion, therefore, is subordinate to that of _Felis_, and to all above it up to Phenomenon; and is co-ordinate with that of tiger, and with all species in the same grade. This is the ground of the old method of definition _per genus et differentiam_. The genus being the next class above any species, the _differentia_ or Difference consists of the qualities which mark that species in addition to those that mark the genus, and which therefore distinguish it from all other species of the same genus. In the above definition of lion, for example, all the properties down to \"light and muscular in build\" are generic, that is, are possessed by the whole genus, _Felis_; and the remaining four (size, colour, tufted tail, and mane in the male) are the Difference or specific properties, because in those points the lion contrasts with the other species of that genus.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":271,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":9,"text_sha256":"a012d3155158c49c40da0a9d988774a3b4726dc5edff1c5c89d4c4652ec08246","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-4ae0cb767440b1251fccaab5","text":"Thus, for a circle: Take any point and, at any constant distance from it, trace a line returning into itself. In Chemistry a genetic definition of any compound might be given in the form of directions for the requisite synthesis of elements. § 6. The chief difficulty in the definition of scientific names consists in determining exactly the nature of the things denoted by them, as in classifying plants and animals. If organic species are free growths, continually changing, however gradually, according as circumstances give some advantage to one form over others, we may expect to find such species branching into varieties, which differ considerably from one another in some respects, though not enough to constitute distinct species. This is the case; and, consequently, there arises some uncertainty in collecting from all the varieties those attributes which are common to the species as a whole; and, therefore, of course, uncertainty in defining the species. The same difficulty may occur in defining a genus, on account of the extent to which some of its species differ from others, whilst having enough of the common character to deter the classifier from forming a distinct genus on their account. On the other hand the occurrence of numerous intermediate varieties may make it difficult to distinguish genera or species at all. Even the Kingdoms of plants and animals are hard to discriminate at the lowest levels of organisation.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":232,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":11,"text_sha256":"ac2a6af737bed6daba4167db35714f43b69e1dac6f61176490bd98a7a851e976","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-31ea6d1b326cec04f307e5f9","text":"Now, where there is a difficulty of classification there must be a corresponding difficulty of definition. It has been proposed in such cases to substitute a Type for a Definition; to select some variety of a species, or species of a genus, as exhibiting its character in an eminent degree, and to regard other groups as belonging to the same species or genus, according as they agree more with this type than with other types representing other species or genera. But the selection of one group as typical implies a recognition of its attributes as prevailing generally (though not universally) throughout the species or genus; and to recognise these attributes and yet refuse to enumerate them in a definition, seems to be no great gain. To enumerate the attributes of the type as an Approximate Definition of the species or genus, true of _most_ of the groups constituting the species or genus, answers the same purpose, is more explicit, and can mislead no one who really attends to the exposition. An approximate definition is, indeed, less misleading than the indication of a type; for the latter method seems to imply that the group which is now typical has a greater permanence or reality than its co-ordinate groups; whereas, for aught we know, one of the outside varieties or species may even now be superseding and extinguishing it.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":227,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":12,"text_sha256":"79669ce979b0315d411abfe5b0188d3c7d5d17f1b98bf4f2c775b7a7daf4d3c6","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-06093b71551a936b2e5451f4","text":"But the statement of a definition as approximate, is an honest confession that both the definition and the classification are (like a provisional hypothesis) merely the best account we can give of the matter according to our present knowledge. § 7. The limits of Definition are twofold: (a) A name whose meaning cannot be analysed cannot be defined. This limitation meets us only in dealing with the names of the metaphysical parts or simple qualities of objects under the second requisite of a Terminology. Resistance and weight, colour and its modes, many names of sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold--in fact, whatever stands for an unanalysable perception, cannot be made intelligible to any one who has not had experience of the facts denoted; they cannot be defined, but only exemplified. A sort of genetic definition may perhaps be attempted, as if we say that colour is the special sensation of the cones of the retina, or that blue is the sensation produced by a ray of light vibrating about 650,000,000,000,000 times a second; but such expressions can give no notion of our meaning to a blind man, or to any one who has never seen a blue object. Nor can we explain what heat is like, or the smell of tobacco, to those who have never experienced them; nor the sound of C 128 to one who knows nothing of the musical scale.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":230,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":13,"text_sha256":"a24aeb4e3143562795fe0e17271021dfe6b25bd995f3eae4d8a78fb83a17743b","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-3777cdf602e58a91cef25961","text":"If we distinguish the property of an object from the sensation it excites in us, we may define any simple property as 'the power of producing the sensation'; the colour of a flower as the power of exciting the sensation of colour in us. Still, this gives no information to the blind nor to the colour-blind. Abstract names may be defined by defining the corresponding concrete: the definition of 'human nature' is the same as of 'man.' But if the corresponding concrete be a simple sensation (as blue), this being indefinable, the abstract (blueness) is also indefinable. (b) The second limit of Definition is the impossibility of exhausting infinity, which would be necessary in order to convey the meaning of the name of any individual thing or person. For, as we saw in chap. iv., if in attempting to define a proper name we stop short of infinity, our list of qualities or properties may possibly be found in two individuals, and then it becomes the definition of a class-name or general name, however small the actual class. Hence we can only give a Description of that which a proper name denotes, enumerating enough of its properties to distinguish it from everything else as far as our knowledge goes. § 8. The five Predicables (Species, Genus, Difference, Proprium, Accident) may best be discussed in connection with Classification and Definition; and in giving an account of Classification, most of what has to be said about them has been anticipated.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":246,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":14,"text_sha256":"7e21b9884970bdb961960334572c851191a869e383e48abda8b9229d68c0a759","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-a780c1be7620d7010d4ccb57","text":"Secondly, the predicate may be, or connote, some _part only_ of the definition or connotation of the species; and then it is either genus (2), or difference (3). Thirdly, the predicate may connote _no part_ of the definition, and then it is either derivable from it, being a proprium (4), or not derivable from it, being an accident (5). These points of doctrine will be expanded and illustrated in subsequent pages. If X be a singular name, deriving connotation from its constituent terms (chap. iv. § 2), as 'The present Emperor of China,' it may be treated as a _Species subjicibilis_. Then that he is 'an absolute monarch,' predicates a genus; because that is a genus of 'Emperor,' a part of the singular name that gives it connotation. That he wears a yellow robe is a proprium, derivable from the ceremonial of his court. That he is thirty years of age is an accident. But if X be a proper name, having no connotation, Y must always be an accident; since there can then be no definition of X, and therefore neither species, genus, difference, nor proprium. Hence, that 'John Doe is a man' is an accidental proposition: 'man' is not here a _Species predicabilis_; for the name might have been given to a dog or a mountain. That is what enables the proposition to convey information: it would be useless if the proper name implied 'humanity.' 'Species' is most frequently used (as in Zoology) for the _class denoted_ by a general name; but in Logic it is better to treat it as a general name used connotatively for the attributes possessed in common by the things denoted, and on account of which they are regarded as a class: it is sometimes called the Essence (§ 9).","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":289,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":16,"text_sha256":"cd205d8413ae85e94e8d995d67c536c814824ca9bd9444c751e050da52a0d486","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-4ad41fdd06a3da4e9c24e1a7","text":"In this connotative sense, a species is implicitly what the definition is explicitly; and therefore the two are always simply convertible. Thus, 'A plane triangle' (species) is 'a figure enclosed by three straight lines' (definition): clearly we may equally say, 'A figure enclosed by three straight lines is a plane triangle.' It is a simple identity. A genus is also commonly viewed denotatively, as a class containing smaller classes, its species; but in Logic it is, again, better to treat it connotatively, as a name whose definition is part of the definition of a given species. A difference is the remainder of the definition of any species after subtracting a given genus. Hence, the genus and difference together make up the species; whence the method of definition _per genus et differentiam_ (_ante_, § 5). Whilst in Botany and Zoology the species is fixed at the lowest step of the classification (varieties not being reckoned as classes), and the genus is also fixed on the step next above it, in Logic these predicables are treated as movable up and down the ladder: any lower class being species in relation to any higher; which higher class, wherever taken, thus becomes a genus. Lion may logically be regarded as a species of digitigrade, or mammal, or animal; and then each of these is a genus as to lion: or, again, digitigrade may be regarded as a species of mammal, or mammal as a species of animal.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":241,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":17,"text_sha256":"1e98649736e85826b126376c09d7acad11c116754f97402478a5d2d912ca486d","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-c489c832925b52d3238998ff","text":"Only one side of each dichotomy is followed out in the 'tree': if the other side had been taken, Incorporeal Substance would be 'Spirit'; which might be similarly subdivided. Genus and species, then, have a double relation. In denotation the genus includes the species; in connotation the species includes the genus. Hence the doctrine that by increasing the connotation of a name we decrease its denotation: if, for example, to the definition of 'lion' we add 'inhabiting Africa,' Asiatic lions are no longer denoted by it. On the other hand, if we use a name to denote objects that it did not formerly apply to, some of the connotation must be dropped: if, for example, the name 'lion' be used to include 'pumas,' the tufted tail and mane can no longer be part of the meaning of the word; since pumas have not these properties. This doctrine is logically or formally true, but it may not always be true in fact. It is logically true; because wherever we add to the connotation of a name, it is possible that some things to which it formerly applied are now excluded from its denotation, though we may not know of any such things. Still, as a matter of fact, an object may be discovered to have a property previously unknown, and this property may be fundamental and co-extensive with the denotation of its name, or even more widely prevalent.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":237,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":19,"text_sha256":"792c63e29de4453f057f892ee1ff0555cf674dce76ee4e6e46dc59d5ae85c076","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-d89306af24ef75b34d766ab1","text":"The discovery that the whale is a mammal did not limit the class 'whale'; nor did the discovery that lions, dogs, wolves, etc., walk upon their toes, affect the application of any of these names. Similarly, the extension of a name to things not previously denoted by it, may not in fact alter its definition; for the extension may be made on the very ground that the things now first denoted by it have been found to have the properties enumerated in its definition, as when the name 'mammal' was applied to whales, dolphins, etc. If, however, 'mammal' had formerly been understood to apply only to land animals, so that its definition included (at least, popularly) the quality of 'living on the land,' this part of the connotation was of course lost when the denotation came to include certain aquatic animals. A proprium is an attribute derived from the definition: being either (a) implied in it, or deducible from it, as 'having its three angles equal to two right angles' may be proved from the definition of a triangle; or (b) causally dependent on it, as being 'dangerous to flocks' results from the nature of a wolf, and as 'moving in an ellipse' results from the nature of a planet in its relation to the sun. An accident is a property accompanying the defining attributes without being deducible from them.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":230,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":20,"text_sha256":"4e94741953f4b6bd8bd97b5d120a1f5be684271d345d1bedfd9d7ce0b4430f29","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-81aee64c747800b2b372a144","text":"The same distinction may be drawn between accidents. 'Inhabiting Asia' is an Inseparable Accident of tiger, but a Separable Accident of lion. Even the occasional characteristics and occupations of individuals are sometimes called separable accidents of the species; as, of man, being colour-blind, carpentering, or running. A proprium in the original signification of the term ἴδιον was peculiar to a species, never found with any other, and was therefore convertible with the subject; but this restriction is no longer insisted on. § 9. Any predication of a genus, difference or definition, is a verbal, analytic, or essential proposition: and any predication of a proprium or accident, is a real, synthetic, or accidental proposition (chap. v. § 6). A proposition is called verbal or analytic when the predicate is a part, or the whole, of the meaning of the subject; and the subject being species, a genus or difference is part, and a definition is the whole, of its meaning or connotation. Hence such a proposition has also been called explicative. Again, a proposition is called real or synthetic when the predicate is no part of the meaning of the subject; and, the subject being species, a proprium or accident is no part of its meaning or connotation. Hence such a proposition has been called ampliative. As to Essential and Accidental, these terms are derived from the doctrine of Realism.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":224,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":22,"text_sha256":"c4dc0587fb432bdaa94fa983413ce98bc35bda34d82b30f73a7ece76dfda17af","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-0780cdc080c1c07298882184","text":"Realists maintain that the essence of a thing, or that which makes a thing to be what (or of what kind) it is, also makes everything else of the same kind to be what it is. The essence, they say, is not proper to each thing or separately inherent in it, but is an 'Universal' common to all things of that kind. Some hold that the universal nature of things of any kind is an Idea existing (apart from the things) in the intelligible world, invisible to mortal eye and only accessible to thought; whence the Idea is called a noumenon: that only the Idea is truly real, and that the things (say, trees, bedsteads and cities) which appear to us in sense-perception, and which therefore are called phenomena, only exist by participating in, or imitating, the Idea of each kind of them. The standard of this school bears the legend _Universalia ante rem_. But others think that the Universal does not exist apart from particular things, but is their present essence; gives them actuality as individual substances; \"informs\" them, or is their formal cause, and thus makes them to be what they are of their kind according to the definition: the universal lion is in all lions, and is not merely similar, but identical in all; for thus the Universal Reason thinks and energises in Nature.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":227,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":23,"text_sha256":"693cdd2ecf46a83774f850bf3c6227edf4b050fb889dc7537af7a9840d2c625a","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-ac52b2fb6276339975e27620","text":"This school inscribes upon its banners, _Universalia in re_. To define anything, then, is to discover its essence, whether transcendent or immanent; and to predicate the definition, or any part of it (genus or difference), is to enounce an essential proposition. But a proprium, being no part of a definition, though it always goes along with it, does not show what a thing is; nor of course does an accident; so that to predicate either of these is to enounce an accidental proposition. Another school of Metaphysicians denies the existence of Universal Ideas or Forms; the real things, according to them, are individuals; which, so far as any of them resemble one another, are regarded as forming classes; and the only Universal is the class-name, which is applied universally in the same sense. Hence, they are called Nominalists. The sense in which any name is applied, they say, is derived from a comparison of the individuals, and by abstraction of the properties they have in common; and thus the definition is formed. _Universalia post rem_ is their motto. Some Nominalists, however, hold that, though Universals do not exist in nature, they do in our minds, as Abstract Ideas or Concepts; and that to define a term is to analyse the concept it stands for; whence, these philosophers are called Conceptualists.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":220,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":24,"text_sha256":"b5ed012096db00d0d13f487c225705f33381132ff8d88d2cb82cb98ecb017caa","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-2a63d0a57cc27a0445821b91","text":"Quantity is predicated as equality (or inequality) a mode of _Likeness_; and the other mode of _Likeness_ is involved in the predication of Quality. Relation, indeed, is the abstract of all predication, and ought not to appear in a list along with special forms of itself. 'Where' is position, or _Co-existence_ in space; and 'When' is position in time, or _Succession_. Action and Passion are the most interesting aspect of _Causation_. Posture and Habit are complex modes of _Co-existence_, but too specialised to have any philosophic value. Now, I do not pretend that this is what Aristotle meant and was trying to say: but if Likeness, Co-existence, Succession and Causation are fundamental forms of predication, a good mind analysing the fact of predication is likely to happen upon them in one set of words or another. By Kant the word 'Category' has been appropriated to the highest forms of judgment, such as Unity, Reality, Substance, and Cause, under which the understanding reduces phenomena to order and thereby constitutes Nature. This change of meaning has not been made without a certain continuity of thought; for forms of judgment are modes of predication. But besides altering the lists of categories and greatly improving it, Kant has brought forward under an old title a doctrine so original and suggestive that it has extensively influenced the subsequent history of Philosophy.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":226,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":27,"text_sha256":"9d9318efd5bf22648e1c423b955c68f6f0cedc320bb7060d1dc154fa572fb835","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-433289d253fd3d7f3bc1c6f3","text":"At the same time, and probably as a result of the vogue of the Kantian philosophy, the word 'category' has been vulgarised as a synonym for 'class,' just as 'predicament' long ago passed from Scholastic Logic into common use as a synonym for 'plight.' A minister is said to be 'in a predicament,' or to fall under the 'category of impostors.' § 1. Ordinary words may need definition, if in the course of exposition or argument their meaning is liable to be mistaken. But as definition cannot give one the sense of a popular word for all occasions of its use, it is an operation of great delicacy. Fixity of meaning in the use of single words is contrary to the genius of the common vocabulary; since each word, whilst having a certain predominant character, must be used with many shades of significance, in order to express the different thoughts and feelings of multitudes of men in endlessly diversified situations; and its force, whenever it is used, is qualified by the other words with which it is connected in a sentence, by its place in the construction of the sentence, by the emphasis, or by the pitch of its pronunciation compared with the other words. Clearly, the requisite of a scientific language, 'that every word shall have one meaning well defined,' is too exacting for popular language; because the other chief requisite of scientific language cannot be complied with, 'that there be no important meaning without a name.' 'Important meanings,' or what seem such, are too numerous to be thus provided for; and new ones are constantly arising, as each of us pursues his business or his pleasure, his meditations or the excursions of his fancy.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":284,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":28,"text_sha256":"73bef3e546bd6c5b5b56c07b591b14b74013154dee73a67af47f23a12091f3d5","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-786eece5fe585338cfd4bd93","text":"Scientific method is applicable, with some qualifications, to the definition of ordinary words. Classification is involved in any problem of definition: at least, if our object is to find a meaning that shall be generally acceptable and intelligible. No doubt two disputants may, for their own satisfaction, adopt any arbitrary definition of a word important in their controversy; or, any one may define a word as he pleases, at the risk of being misunderstood, provided he has no fraudulent intention. But in exposition or argument addressed to the public, where words are used in some of their ordinary senses, it should be recognised that the meaning of each one involves that of many others. For language has grown with the human mind, as representing its knowledge of the world: this knowledge consists of the resemblances and differences of things and of the activities of things, that is, of classes and causes; and as there is such order in the world, so there must be in language: language, therefore, embodies an irregular classification of things with their attributes and relations according to our knowledge and beliefs. The best attempt (known to me) to carry out this view is contained in Roget's _Thesaurus_, which is a classification of English words according to their meanings: founded, as the author tells us, on the models of Zoology and Botany, it has some of the requisites of a Logical Dictionary.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":235,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":30,"text_sha256":"584b2864dee9b2251ee2791d580e26af323a07dfd074ad1971c55ec438a68a40","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-6dcfa512947ff1d24e627c74","text":"Popular language, indeed, having grown up with a predominantly practical purpose, represents a very imperfect classification philosophically considered. Things, or aspects, or processes of things, that have excited little interest, have often gone unnamed: so that scientific discoverers are obliged, for scientific purposes, to invent thousands of new names. Strong interests, on the other hand, give such a colour to language, that, where they enter, it is difficult to find any indifferent expressions. _Consistency_ being much prized, though often the part of a blockhead, _inconsistency_ implies not merely the absence of the supposed virtue, but a positive vice: _Beauty_ being attractive and _ugliness_ the reverse, if we invent a word for that which is neither, 'plainness,' it at once becomes tinged with the ugly. We seem to love beauty and morality so much as to be almost incapable of signifying their absence without expressing aversion. Again, the erroneous theories of mankind have often found their way into popular speech, and their terms have remained there long after the rejection of the beliefs they embodied: as--lunatic, augury, divination, spell, exorcism: though, to be sure, such words may often be turned to good account, besides the interest of preserving their original sense. Language is a record as well as an index of ideas. Language, then, being essentially classificatory, any attempt to ascertain the meaning of a word, far from neglecting its relations to others, should be directed toward elucidating them.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":239,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":31,"text_sha256":"a0386e00b778ccfaefceacff30e0e68ff802b84004aea0ef2d91b5483389fa49","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-f3dbcef82aa8bfdc5c0f4e43","text":"Every word belongs to a group, and this group to some other larger group. A group is sometimes formed by derivation, at least so far as different meanings are marked merely by inflections, as _short_, _shorter_, _shorten_, _shortly_; but, for the most part, is a conflux of words from many different sources. _Repose_, _depose_, _suppose_, _impose_, _propose_, are not nearly connected in meaning; but are severally allied in sense much more closely with words philologically remote. Thus _repose_ is allied with _rest_, _sleep_, _tranquillity_; _disturbance_, _unrest_, _tumult_; whilst _depose_ is, in one sense, allied with _overthrow_, _dismiss_, _dethrone_; _restore_, _confirm_, _establish_; and, in another sense, with _declare_, _attest_, _swear_, _prove_, etc. Groups of words, in fact, depend on their meanings, just as the connection of scientific names follows the resemblance in character of the things denoted. Words, accordingly, stand related to one another, for the most part, though very irregularly, as genus, species, and co-ordinate species. Taking _repose_ as a genus, we have as species of it, though not exactly co-ordinate with one another, _tranquillity_ with a mental differentia (repose of mind), _rest_, whether of mind or body, _sleep_, with the differentia of unconsciousness (privative). Synonyms are species, or varieties, wherever any difference can be detected in them; and to discriminate them we must first find the generic meaning; for which there may, or may not, be a single word.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":230,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":32,"text_sha256":"4ea5f11bc9873201bcde6dbc49799bf301dc13ed554e5e50b8c5fc2f9a545da7","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-495c19ae098e642a8f4a0e0b","text":"Thus, _equality_, _sameness_, _likeness_, _similarity_, _resemblance_, _identity_, are synonyms; but, if we attend to the ways in which they are actually used, perhaps none of them can claim to be a genus in relation to the rest. If so, we must resort to a compound term for the genus, such as 'absence of some sort of difference.' Then _equality_ is absence of difference in quantity; _sameness_ is often absence of difference in quality, though the usage is not strict: _likeness_, _similarity_, and _resemblance_, in their actual use, perhaps, cannot be discriminated; unless _likeness_ be the more concrete, _similarity_ the more abstract; but they may all be used compatibly with the recognition of more or less difference in the things compared, and even imply this. _Identity_ is the absence of difference of origin, a continuity of existence, with so much sameness from moment to moment as is compatible with changes in the course of nature; so that egg, caterpillar, chrysalis, butterfly may be identical for the run of an individual life, in spite of differences quantitative and qualitative, as truly as a shilling that all the time lies in a drawer. Co-ordinate Species, when positive, have the least contrariety; but there are also opposites, namely, negatives, contradictories and fuller contraries. These may be regarded as either co-ordinate genera or the species of co-ordinate genera.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":223,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":33,"text_sha256":"6302894eb94e643a0b84f41d3e4878bcbe47cf7beec1d64332968b08f029046e","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-b99e7fa1bc064a45f289df8f","text":"Partially similar to a scientific nomenclature, ordinary language has likewise a terminology for describing things according to their qualities and structure. Such is the function of all the names of colours, sounds, tastes, contrasts of temperature, of hardness, of pleasantness; in short, of all descriptive adjectives, and all names for the parts and processes of things. Any word connoting a quality may be used to describe many very different things, as long as they agree in that quality. But the quality connoted by a word, and treated as always the same quality, is often only analogically the same. We speak of a _great_ storm, a _great_ man, a _great_ book; but _great_ is in each case not only relative, implying small, and leaving open the possibility that what we call great is still smaller than something else of its kind, but it is also predicated with reference to some quality or qualities, which may be very different in the several cases of its application. If the book is prized for wisdom, or for imagination, its greatness lies in that quality; if the man is distinguished for influence, or for courage, his greatness is of that nature; if the storm is remarkable for violence, or for duration, its greatness depends on that fact. The word _great_, therefore, is not used for these things in the same sense, but only analogically and elliptically.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":231,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":35,"text_sha256":"20db45061d138e8018ec67a65fcc082535d482487144c8b8d0464fc6587ffd3f","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-44ee339a77548f554b39cc12","text":"Similarly with good, pure, free, strong, rich, and so on. 'Rest' has not the same meaning in respect of a stone and of an animal, nor 'strong' in respect of thought and muscle, nor 'sweet' in respect of sugar and music. But here we come to the border between literal and figurative use; every one sees that figurative epithets are analogical; but by custom any figurative use may become literal. Again, many general names of widely different meaning, are brought together in describing any concrete object, as an animal, or a landscape, or in defining any specific term. This is the sense of the doctrine, that any concrete thing is a conflux of generalities or universals: it may at least be considered in this way; though it seems more natural to say, that an object presents these different aspects to a spectator, who, fully to comprehend it, must classify it in every aspect. § 4. The process of seeking a definition may be guided by the following maxims: (1) Find the usage of good modern authors; that is (as they rarely define a word explicitly), consider what in various relations they use it to denote; from which uses its connotation may be collected. (2) But if this process yield no satisfactory result, make a list of the things denoted, and of those denoted by the co-ordinate and opposite words; and observe the qualities in which the things denoted agree, and in which they differ from those denoted by the contraries and opposites.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":248,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":36,"text_sha256":"ff19ccf4eedaf7c68a1e8d1cb308e23b931913a0bfcfbf3e0c3f469620e8fcea","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-f63d0207693a237f001c9f13","text":"And however a definition be discovered, it is well to state it _per genus et differentiam_. (4) In defining any term we should avoid encroaching upon the meaning of any of the co-ordinate terms; for else their usefulness is lessened: as by making 'law' include 'custom,' or 'wealth' include 'labour' or 'culture.' (5) If two or more terms happen to be exactly synonymous, it may be possible (and, if so, it is a service to the language) to divert one of them to any neighbouring meaning that has no determinate expression. Thus, Wordsworth and Coleridge took great pains to distinguish between Imagination and Fancy, which had become in common usage practically equivalent; and they sought to limit 'imagination' to an order of poetic effect, which (they said) had prevailed during the Elizabethan age, but had been almost lost during the Gallo-classic, and which it was their mission to restore. Co-ordinate terms often tend to coalesce and become synonymous, or one almost supersedes the other, to the consequent impoverishment of our speech. At present _proposition_ (that something is the fact) has almost driven out _proposal_ (that it is desirable to co-operate in some action). Even good writers and speakers, by their own practice, encourage this confusion: they submit to Parliament certain 'propositions' (proposals for legislation), or even make 'a proposition of marriage.' Definition should counteract such a tendency.","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":225,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":38,"text_sha256":"c19e5e0fd95d51a4f788723312db05444ef364741fb54994463c1b3990325483","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-0ffd4625a23da3e9824369d3","text":"And as we have seen (§ 3), such epithets may be applicable to objects on account of different qualities: _good_ is not predicated on the same ground of a man and of a horse. (7) In defining any word, it is desirable to bear in mind its derivation, and to preserve the connection of meaning with its origin; unless there are preponderant reasons for diverting it, grounded on our need of the word to express a certain sense, and the greater difficulty of finding any other word for the same purpose. It is better to lean to the classical than to the vulgar sense of 'indifferent,' 'impertinent,' 'aggravating,' 'phenomenal.' (8) Rigorous definition should not be attempted where the subject does not admit of it. Some kinds of things are so complex in their qualities, and each quality may manifest itself in so many degrees without ever admitting of exact measurement, that we have no means of marking them off precisely from other things nearly allied, similarly complex and similarly variable. If so we cannot precisely define their names. Imagination and fancy are of this nature, civilisation and barbarism, poetry and other kinds of literary expression. As to poetry, some think it only exists in metre, but hardly maintain that the metre must be strictly regular: if not, how much irregularity of rhythm is admissible?","language":"en","topic":"reasoning_language","word_count":220,"source_record_id":"18440-0-12","source_title":"Logic: Deductive and Inductive","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18440","source_collection":"Gutenberg","source_record_year":null,"source_publication_label":"1914 fourth edition; reprint history through May 1920","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Original catalog marks Public domain in the USA; author Carveth Read (1848-1931). Fourth-edition preface August 1914; reprint history through May 1920. Bibliographic attribution only; provider boilerplate omitted from model text.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":40,"text_sha256":"7ce98c3d49611283f20a6126ba70d0bf0cc209d7794afbd956c5338f4412017c","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-b730f2677db9126ab2a9fb41","text":"It may not be irrelevant to observe that there is as great a difference between the character of the ramification of an old tree and that of a young one, as there is between the character of their touch. There is a certain degree of sameness in the disposition of the branches of all young trees, from their tendency upwards, and perhaps still more from their being so fully clothed with leaves. Old trees, on the other hand, have generally a majority of their branches in horizontal or very oblique directions, and they are never so fully covered with leaves and spray as is the case with young trees. As a result of what we have stated, the general forms of young trees present a certain degree of sameness; while in old trees of distinct species there is a very distinct character in the general form, in the trunk, the ramification, the tufting, and the touch. Any one may be convinced of this by observing any particular species, not of very common recurrence, in the arboretum of the Horticultural Society's garden, or in that of Messrs. Loddiges, and observing the same tree of fifty or sixty years of age, at Syon, Purser's Cross, Chiswick, Upton, or any of the places noted for old American trees in the neighborhood of London.","language":"en","topic":"forestry_ecology","word_count":220,"source_record_id":"arboretumetfruti01loudrich_33","source_title":"Arboretum et fruticetum britannicum; or, The trees and shrubs of Britain, native and foreign, hardy and half-hardy, pictorially and botanically delineated, and scientifically and popularly described; with their propagation, culture, management, and uses in the arts, in useful and ornamental plantations, and in landscape-gardening; preceded by a historical and geographical outline of the trees and shrubs of temperate climates throughout the world","source_url":"https://archive.org/details/arboretumetfruti01loudrich","source_collection":"US-PD-Books","source_record_year":1854,"source_publication_label":"1854","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Archive date, volume1, and NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT statement.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":0,"text_sha256":"0edac17202d380d659c9c9faae151123c8ba428f6881df79091c65b4e334f2a0","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-635ce43995b345c68b96eb6e","text":"It must be evident to the reader, that, before any use can be made of the history of any tree or shrub, means must be devised for distinguishing what particular tree or shrub is meant. From the want of these means, or the ignorance in this branch of knowledge of travellers, many of their remarks on trees, and other organised objects, are of little use: because it is impossible for botanists to ascertain, from their descriptions or names, to what species of tree or shrub these names or descriptions apply. There can be no doubt that the difficulties in this respect are much greater when applied to the whole vegetable kingdom, than when they are limited to trees and shrubs; and more especially when they are limited to the Trees and shrubs supposed to be actually growing in Britain. But even among these, which, probably, do not greatly exceed 1500, there is, at present, the greatest uncertainty in the application of names. In genera consisting of many species, there are scarcely two of the London nurseries where the same names are applied to the same things; and what in one nursery is considered as a variety is, in many cases, elevated in other nurseries to the rank of a species. Hence it becomes necessary, in a work like the present, not only to give our reasons for the classification which we have followed, but also for the specific distinctions which we have drawn, and for the kind of descriptions and figures which we have adopted.","language":"en","topic":"forestry_ecology","word_count":254,"source_record_id":"arboretumetfruti01loudrich_33","source_title":"Arboretum et fruticetum britannicum; or, The trees and shrubs of Britain, native and foreign, hardy and half-hardy, pictorially and botanically delineated, and scientifically and popularly described; with their propagation, culture, management, and uses in the arts, in useful and ornamental plantations, and in landscape-gardening; preceded by a historical and geographical outline of the trees and shrubs of temperate climates throughout the world","source_url":"https://archive.org/details/arboretumetfruti01loudrich","source_collection":"US-PD-Books","source_record_year":1854,"source_publication_label":"1854","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Archive date, volume1, and NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT statement.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":6,"text_sha256":"a354330a207c07cebee1974ce0ed56ef277aedb5be14bc05542d9b9a2c0147dc","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-65e812b9e7209eb2e29f15ce","text":"The reason of this is to be found in the difficulty of determining what are species, or natural and permanent forms; and what forms are accidental, or the result of culture, soil, situation, disease, &c., or of cross fecundation; and because the present disposition of botanists seems to be to multiply species rather than to diminish their number. When we look into a modern catalogue of plants, we are astonished, and almost confounded, by the great number of specific names which are ranked under one generic name. If we endeavour, by inspecting the names more particularly, to discover any relationship between them, we are utterly at a loss. One name is, perhaps, an adjective denoting colour, or some other property belonging to the plant, another indicates the native country of the species; and a third shows that it has been named in commemoration of some place, or of some individual. If we look at the column, in such catalogues, which indicates the native country of the species, the difficulty is increased rather than lessened: perhaps a native of the tropics is placed next a plant from the frigid zone. In this, as in similar cases of collecting knowledge, the first step is to accumulate facts, and the second is to generalise on them. Hitherto it would appear, that, as far as regards species and varieties, the great object of botanists has been to increase their number, without much regard to grouping them according to their relationship.","language":"en","topic":"forestry_ecology","word_count":246,"source_record_id":"arboretumetfruti01loudrich_33","source_title":"Arboretum et fruticetum britannicum; or, The trees and shrubs of Britain, native and foreign, hardy and half-hardy, pictorially and botanically delineated, and scientifically and popularly described; with their propagation, culture, management, and uses in the arts, in useful and ornamental plantations, and in landscape-gardening; preceded by a historical and geographical outline of the trees and shrubs of temperate climates throughout the world","source_url":"https://archive.org/details/arboretumetfruti01loudrich","source_collection":"US-PD-Books","source_record_year":1854,"source_publication_label":"1854","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Archive date, volume1, and NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT statement.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":10,"text_sha256":"5cd1059a3cdaad879e91afac751b2afcfddbd789e6bb4c1cab9c3b2c877914c8","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-29a2569256388ee7824e5aaa","text":"We allow, however, that, if a great many seeds taken from the fruit of a jargonelle pear with variegated leaves were sown, some of the plants so raised would probably show variegation in their foliage. The same thing, we think, would take place in the case of sowing the seed of variegated hollies, or of fastigiate or pendulous-branched plants, but to what extent it is impossible to say. It certainly would not take place to such an extent as to confound varieties with races, or to render it desirable to propagate varieties in this way; and, consequently, varieties are always propagated by some modification of division, such as by cuttings, layers, grafting, &c. Variations differ from varieties in not being transmittible by any mode of propagation. They are always produced by local circumstances operating on the individual; and the moment these circumstances are changed, the variation disappears. For example, plants grown in the dark will have their leaves white; other plants with hairy leaves, when grown in water, will have their leaves smooth; and the hydrangea, grown in a certain description of soil, will have its flowers blue: but, remove the plant with white leaves to the light, and place the plant grown in water in dry soil, and the hydrangea in common soil, and it will be found that the leaves of the first will become green, and those of the second hairy, and that the flowers of the hydrangea will resume their natural pinkish hue.","language":"en","topic":"forestry_ecology","word_count":247,"source_record_id":"arboretumetfruti01loudrich_33","source_title":"Arboretum et fruticetum britannicum; or, The trees and shrubs of Britain, native and foreign, hardy and half-hardy, pictorially and botanically delineated, and scientifically and popularly described; with their propagation, culture, management, and uses in the arts, in useful and ornamental plantations, and in landscape-gardening; preceded by a historical and geographical outline of the trees and shrubs of temperate climates throughout the world","source_url":"https://archive.org/details/arboretumetfruti01loudrich","source_collection":"US-PD-Books","source_record_year":1854,"source_publication_label":"1854","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Archive date, volume1, and NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT statement.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":19,"text_sha256":"e5c418c26f1563ac6bf2886cafb1e4578bdb6c0858dc4ebc6714063eb0d5c788","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-733bb41910749417fa822d94","text":"If the directors of these gardens were to cooperate, and Each to undertake the collection and the study of one or more genera of hardy plants, we should, at no distant period, be able to say what are really species, and what are not. If botanic gardens were established in every country and climate of the world, and the whole of the directors of these gardens were to act in concert (which concert, being quite distinct from political associations, would not be objected to by any government), in each garden might be assembled all the alleged species or varieties of at least two or three genera, those being selected for which its climate, situation, soil, and extent were most suitable; and, after a few years, the aboriginal species, and the more prominent varieties, might be determined on. In the meantime, this process might be commenced in many of the botanic gardens already established in the temperate regions of the world; and we have already shown (p. 192.) how, in every country in these regions, the determination of species, and their nomenclature, might be effected, as far as respect Hardy trees and shrubs. When the natural system of botany comes to be more generally understood and cultivated, there will not, we may presume, be that desire, which now seems to exist among botanists, to increase the number of species.","language":"en","topic":"forestry_ecology","word_count":227,"source_record_id":"arboretumetfruti01loudrich_33","source_title":"Arboretum et fruticetum britannicum; or, The trees and shrubs of Britain, native and foreign, hardy and half-hardy, pictorially and botanically delineated, and scientifically and popularly described; with their propagation, culture, management, and uses in the arts, in useful and ornamental plantations, and in landscape-gardening; preceded by a historical and geographical outline of the trees and shrubs of temperate climates throughout the world","source_url":"https://archive.org/details/arboretumetfruti01loudrich","source_collection":"US-PD-Books","source_record_year":1854,"source_publication_label":"1854","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Archive date, volume1, and NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT statement.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":27,"text_sha256":"9d419cb0b9e7592d0d999b709f863799a555a42693026b9134d3a93ff9f60f48","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-dfa82ca40bb071f79f4f16da","text":"Occasionally we hear of a new fibrous plant, a new vegetable, or a new fruit, but after the first outburst of glorification awarded to it, not only the product but the plant itself often disappears, to be heard of again, perhaps, in another decade. It is true that many of the introductions of past years have been natives of tropical, or at least of warmer countries than our own, and as such stand but a poor chance for general cultivation here. The south and west of England and the sister country, Ireland, have mostly been advocated as suitable for extensive experiment in this way, but British crops, whether of field or forest, remain pretty much the same as they were at the beginning of the century. With regard to forest produce, which is the point upon which we are more particularly interested, we cannot refer to any recent startling introduction of great economic value. Without professing to know anything of practical forestry, it seems to us that the introduction and cultivation of useful and ornamental trees are points that do not receive sufficient attention. We may glory in our \" brave old oaks,\" our noble elms, Scotch firs, larches, and other well known British trees, and we should by all means persist- ently plant them, that England's forests may continue to be in future generations what they have been in the past ; but for the sake of variety, for picturesque effect, as well as with a view of providing a home supply of some of the fine foreign timber we occasionally see in special collections, it is desirable that trees of other climes should be more extensively planted in this country than they are.","language":"en","topic":"forestry_ecology","word_count":283,"source_record_id":"journalofforestr01lond_30","source_title":"The journal of forestry and estates management","source_url":"https://archive.org/details/journalofforestr01lond","source_collection":"English-PD","source_record_year":1878,"source_publication_label":"1877–1878","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Archive volume field 1,1877–1878 and NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT statement.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":11,"text_sha256":"f9082a13056ec2a7b02d1b79e95723c089e508d3a729033bd418236270f35c67","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}
{"id":"kh-llm-55e899f981f0627649ba51fe","text":"One point which deserves the consideration of all planters is the judicious admixture of deep-rooting and surface-rooting trees, as by adopting this method a more complete occupation of the whole soil is secured. Another is the necessity of thoroughly clearing the ground of all remains of its former vegetation before proceeding with new plantations upon old forest or woodlands. By such means alone can the destruction of insects iujurious to the timber be secured. The value of the spruce and silver firs as nurses and screens is often underrated ; for where they have sufficient space they retain their lower branches even to old age. By shortening the top they may be made to afford good bottom shelter, and the spruce may even be clipped into a compact hedge. Its protection during the earlier stages of its growth far exceeds that of the Scotch fir, and it will develop a good bottom in about one-half the space required by the latter. The growth of the silver fir is slow at first, but after the age of nine or ten years it shoots up rapidly. In an article specially devoted to planting it is unnecessary to make more than a passing allusion to the connected operations of fencing and drainage, without which in most situations the planter's labours are thrown away. A thoroughly secure fence, impervious to sheep, cattle and horses, is the first consideration.","language":"en","topic":"forestry_ecology","word_count":233,"source_record_id":"journalofforestr01lond_30","source_title":"The journal of forestry and estates management","source_url":"https://archive.org/details/journalofforestr01lond","source_collection":"English-PD","source_record_year":1878,"source_publication_label":"1877–1878","source_license":"Public Domain","rights_jurisdiction":"United States","rights_basis":"Archive volume field 1,1877–1878 and NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT statement.","source_dataset":"PleIAs/common_corpus","source_revision":"307910e4c5d040d6f318e6edf2a2b97849155771","source_shard":"common_corpus_1/subset_100_1.parquet","source_chunk_ordinal":20,"text_sha256":"0e292fa3a45da4a6804a1d2f1beaeb5a60b245e8a1b9cbc77548ec18e06c66a6","status":"PRELIMINARY","curation_version":"2026-10-23-preliminary-v1"}